Japan and the World bank, 1951-1966: Japan as a Borrower by Abe Yoshiaki
?     ?217
Japan and the World Bank, 1951–1966:  Japan as a Borrower
Japan and the World Bank, 1951–1966:  
Japan as a Borrower
Yoshiaki Abe†
??小稿?日本?世界銀行?借?手????時代?経験?記録??????目的???調査研究?最初?研
究結果???。???????条約????設立??? IMF／世銀?日本?加盟申請???1951年?始???
?，1953年?最初?借款??1966年?最後?借款迄?13年間?合計31件?案件?通??合計863億??
?外貨?借?入??話???。??小稿?日本?条約?加盟申請??時??，世銀???最初?借款????
?時迄?記録???。
阿 部 義 章
1.?Introduction
I plan to publish in this journal, a series of papers on Japanʼs experiences as a borrower from 
the World Bank （WB） between 1951 and 1966, by reviewing reports published by the WB and the 
documents available at the IMF and the WB Archives. e purpose of this study is to record Japanʼs 
experiences as a borrower from the WB and to qualitatively evaluate the relationship between Japan 
and the WB.
is paper is the rst installment of the entire series that is periodically organized in the following 
order:
a. Overview
b. 1951–1953, From Applying for Membership and Joining the WB to Receiving the First Loan
c. 1954–1957, Receiving Small Loans for Financing Foreign Exchange Expenditures
d. 1958–1961, From Receiving Loans for Financing Foreign Exchange and Local Cost Expenditures 
to Becoming Ineligible For Bank Financing
e. 1963–1965, Restarting the Receipt of Loans
f. 1966, Graduating From Bank Borrowing
g. Concluding Remarks
is work, the rst of the series will address the rst two themes mentioned above. It will cover 
the overview of Japanʼs borrowing from the WB and Japanʼs initial association with the WB between 
1951 and 1953.
e entire series is being prepared on the basis of the reviewing various Reports and documents 
available at the WB. e list, rst of all includes the Annual Reports of the WB, that serves as a 
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useful document to learn about the Bankʼs history and in particular it provides a detailed account 
of the nancial transformation of the WB and changes in its lending policies. Secondly, there are 11 
Economic Reports, and these present the macroeconomic position of Japan almost on an annual 
basis. e rst of these Economic Reports, dated June 1953, has been the key for setting the tone of 
the relationship between Japan and the WB, as a new member and a new borrower. ere are also 
two Sector Reports on agriculture and steel production. irdly, the Presidentʼs Reports as well as the 
Appraisal Reports and/or Technical Reports on all projects associated with the 31 loans to Japan, have 
been used as the basic sources of information to understand the structure of loans, components and 
justication for the project lending and the conditions attached. Finally, the les available at the IMF 
and the WBʼs Archives have been important sources of information and their review has been vital 
in constructing a comprehensive record of Japanʼs experiences as a borrower from the WB. Annex 1 
provides a list of all the Economic Reports including the two Sector Reports; the Annex 2, a list of all 
the loans with their details including information such as the amount, time frame, the beneciary, and 
the nanced items; and, the Annex 3, a summary of the rst WB loans.
2.?Overview
In August 1951, Japan applied for membership to the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the 
WB and IMF. Japan then, was not an independent country but an occupied territory. It was only aer 
the Peace Treaty was ratied in April 1952 that Japan could return to the international arena as an 
independent country. Japan became a member of the WB/IMF soon aerward on August 13, 1952. 
West Germany also became a member on the next day. While Japan never borrowed funds from the 
IMF,1 she became an active borrower from the WB. However, Japanʼs history as a WB borrower was 
short and dramatic. She borrowed a total of US$863 million spread out as 31 loans between 1953 
and 1966. Tables 1 and 2 below provide the general trends. As Table 1 shows, during the initial 4 
years of being a borrower （1953–1957） the total borrowings amounted to US$84.9 million with an 
average of US$10.6 million per loan. is compares starkly with the last 4 years （1963–1966） where 
the gures rose to US$ 375 million and US$53.6 million, respectively. It is ironic to note that Japan 
was more in need of nancial assistance during the rst period rather than the latter period, as the 
Japanese economy had grown substantially by the end of the latter period. Table 2 indicates that the 
main sectors that received the WB funds were transport （59% of the total borrowing）, power （21%）, 
and industry, mainly going to steel （19%）. Among the total 31 loans, 13 are to the public sector 
corporations and 18, to the private companies; and, among the total lending of US$863 million, about 
64% lent to the public sector corporations and about 36%m to the private sector companies.
1 According to IMF Annual Reports of 1954, 1958 and 1962, Japan did make drawings on the IMF in 1953 and 1957, each 
amounting to about US$125 million, which were cancelled through repurchases in 1955 and 1958, respectively. In addition, in 
January 1962, Japan entered into a stand-by arrangement of US$ 305 million with the IMF but Japan did not use that facility 
as her foreign exchange position improved in the meantime.
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e rst economic mission of the WB visited Japan in October 1952 for two months in order to 
study the overall nature of the Japanese economy and its nancial problems. e Economic Report 
published in June 1953 contains the analysis of the economic situation, the prospects and investment 
requirements. Apart from that the Report also highlighted the problems in power, coal and steel, 
food production and transportation sectors.2 e tone of the report was very cautious, due to the 
uncertainties in the macroeconomic management capabilities of the Japanese Government in general, 
the future of exports and imports, the possible reduction of dollar income from American military 
expenditures aer the Korean War, and the political unrest in Japan. is led to the lending policy 
decision of the WB to Japan, that it would initially lend for nancing the foreign expenditures of about 
US$100 million, over the following few years.
Table 1.　Lending to Japan by Calendar Year （US$ million）
Year Total Amounts # of Loans Average Amounts Year
Total 
Amounts # of Loans
Average 
Amounts
1953  40.2 3 16.9 1960  65.0 4  16.3
1954 * * * 1961 120.0 2  60.0
1955   5.3 1  5.3 1962 * * *
1956  32.4 3 10.8 1963  75.0 1  75.0
1957   7.0 1  7.0 1964  75.0 2  37.5
1958 164.0 7 23.7 1965 125.0 3  41.7
1959  54.0 3 18.0 1966 100.0 1 100.0
Source: Authorʼs tabulation on the basis of information available in ANNEX 2.
Table 2.　Lending to Japan by Sector
Sector # of Loans Total Amount （US$ million）
Public
Transport-Roads  8 430
Transport-Rail  1  80
Power  2  35
Agriculture  2  11
Subtotal 13 556
Private
Power  7 143
Industry 11 163
Subtotal 18 306
Grandtotal 31 863
Sources: Authorʼs tabulation on the basis of information available in Annex 2
Note: e total amount may not add up to the total. Of lending to the industrial sector, about 97% was for the steel industry.
2 Economic Situation and Prospects, Report # A.S.10-1, June 30, 1953, e World Bank.
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e rst lending to Japan was based on nancing their needs priority, which were of high 
importance and urgency, went to the imports for thermal plants of three private power companies. 
is was entirely dierent from what the Japanese Government expected, as it had planned to nance 
equipment imports through the Export Import Bank of the US and hydro-dam construction programs 
through the WB. is implied that the Government sought to get possible local cost nancing in 
addition to nancing of the foreign expenditures from the WB. Japan was also surprised to see the WB 
getting into policy discussions on such subjects as macro-economic issues, electricity rates and the 
nancial status of the power companies. ough both sides learned from each other greatly as time 
passed by, the WB continued to maintain its original conservative position for some time. ough 
the amount of the rst loan was surprisingly large, about US$ 40 million, the subsequent loans were 
generally much smaller, although the basic lending structure remained the same. e lending was 
structured in such a way where Japan Development Bank （JDB） was the borrower through which the 
loans were re-lent to the nal beneciary of funds, which were the companies in the private sector 
including power and steel companies. e exceptions were two loans made directly to the Government 
agencies in the agriculture sector that dealt with the development of irrigation and land reclamation 
projects in 1956 and 1957. e Japanese Government guaranteed all loans. However, there was a lot of 
criticism in Japan by the end users of the WB funds, as they were subject to higher cost of borrowing 
and the laborious and lengthy process of acquiring WBʼs funds even for getting small loans.
e WB nally changed its lending policy towards Japan in 1957, aer it had achieved high rates 
of economic growth. e concluding remark of e Economic Report of July 1957 indicates that 
“Considering the future growth of the economy and exports, the present and prospective volume of 
external indebtedness and Japanʼs excellent debt record, and assuming that serious ination is avoided, 
Japan would be justied in borrowing substantial sums over the next year or two in order to relieve the 
strain resulting from the need to increase essential investments in a number of elds.”3 e WB started 
local cost nancing from 1958 and at the same time the size of each loan became larger than the ones 
provided during the initial period as can be observed in Table 1. As Japan was being greatly praised 
for its economic performance, the WB further assisted Japan in getting into the New York nancial 
market between the end of 1958 and early 1959. Using the Boardʼs presentation for a power loan, for 
US$10 million to a public sector agency called the Electric Power Development Corporation （EPDC） 
the WB announced that Japan would be raising US$30 million in the New York market through public 
oerings.4 is operation was quite successful and similar eorts were made later on to synchronize 
WB lending and public bond oering in the New York nancial market.
As Japanʼs economic growth continued, the tone of the Economic Report became more optimistic 
3 Development and Prospects of the Economy, Report # FE-2a, dated July 25, 1957, the World Bank.
4 Supplemental Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Japan 
Development Bank for the Miboro Hydroelectric Project of the Electric Power Development Company, Japan dated February 
9, 1959, the World Bank.
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than before. e Economic Report of April 1961 described Japanese economy as: “In the past two years 
the economy of Japan has expanded on a scale which is surprisingly large even by Japanese standards. 
［…］ As to the longer run, it seems reasonable to expect relatively high rates of growth to continue on 
the average for some time. Ocial sights have been set on the target of doubling the national income 
by 1970. is objective may not be un-realistic, judging by past performance and the demonstrated 
forces and capacities within Japan for economic expansion. ［…］”. Japan quickly became one of the 
market eligible countries and as a result its graduation from Bank borrowing was hinted in early 1961 
as stated in the WB Presidentʼs Report of November 1961 in connection with a loan to Nihon Doro 
Kodan （Japan Highway Public Corporation）.5 Aer that loan was made, the WB stopped its lending to 
Japan.
After one and half year of non-lending to Japan, lending to Japan resumed in September 
1963 because of Japanʼs need for extra foreign exchange. is was caused by insucient external 
capital available in the private markets, and partly by the US announcement of their proposal to 
introduce an Interest Equalization Tax.6 Most of the lending aer resumption was made to highway 
construction. However, the WB was becoming discomt soon aer resuming its lending to Japan, 
as Japan continued to grow at very high rates. e WB was recommending in early 1965 a system of 
charging extra interest rates for lending to market eligible countries, including Japan. e WB then 
applied this new policy by adding an extra 1% to the interest rate of a highway loan to Japan presented 
to the Board in May 1965.7 A clear and strong message was sent to Japan that she should be getting 
foreign exchange resources not from the WB but from the international markets. e last Economic 
Report of November 23, 1965 states in its summary: “Past high economic growth resulted in the per 
capita income of US$ 720 in 1964 which increased from a very low level aer the war to the Italian 
level. Japanʼs creditworthiness is ample for substantial additional borrowing of foreign capital on 
conventional terms.” And nally the sixth highway project was presented to the Board in July 1966 and 
this became the last loan to Japan.8
3.?1951–1952 Applying for Membership and Becoming a Member
Japan applied to become a member of the Bretton Woods Institutions, IMF and WB in August 
5 Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to Nihon Doro Kodan for the 
Kobe-Nagoya Expressway Second Project dated November 21, 1961, the World Bank.
6 Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to Nihon Doro Kodan for the 
Tokyo-Shizuoka Expressway Project dated September 16, 1963, the World Bank.
7 Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to Nihon Doro Kodan for the 
Shizuoka Toyokawa Expressway, dated may 14, 1965, the World Bank
8 Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to Nihon Doro Kodan, Japan 
dated July 19, 1966, the World Bank.
9 e basic documents related to the Japanʼs application to the IMF/WB are publicly available only in IMF Archives. But since 
the process of application to the IMF is done in parallel to that to the WB, there is no major discrepancy between the two. 
Aer all, unless the country becomes a member of the IMF, she cannot become a member of the WB; vide IBRD Articles of 
Agreement, Article II, Section 1. Membership.
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1951.9 She was still under occupation, and the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers was 
being draed. Japanʼs economy then was in the process of being rehabilitated from a war-damaged 
economy. e principle elements of the economic policies being implemented were:
1. Balancing a consolidated national budget in order to reduce the inationary pressures;
2. Terminating the activities of the Reconstruction Finance Bank, whose loans were uneconomical;
3. Decreasing the scope of government intervention in the economy, especially in the form of 
subsidies, and price controls;
4. Establishing an exchange rate of Y360 to $1; and,
5. Restarting international trade through private channels instead of through government trading 
agencies.
Due to the implementation of the economic policies in accordance with the above principle elements, 
ination was slowly being tamed and exports were increasing and imports were decreasing. Japan 
was gaining condence in being able to eciently manage its macro-economic situation and was 
also trying to get back into the international arena through applying for membership in international 
organizations including the International Labor Organization and GATT.
When the Japanese Government was preparing its application for the IMF/WB membership, 
the US Government, including Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers （SCAP）, the State 
Department and the Treasury Department, did consider potential problems with the IMF on 
the status of Japan being an occupied territory. From the point of view of the IMF, the minimum 
essential consideration would be that countries joining the IMF should be in a position to carry 
out independently all their obligations under the IMF Agreement and are free to collaborate 
independently with the IMF. e obvious question was if Japan, being an occupied territory, could 
satisfy the minimum essential consideration, without being overtly controlled by the US and the Allied 
Powers.
ere was  one principle concern. is was the Far Eastern Commissionʼs （FEC） policy decision 
on “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” of June 19, 1947. is policy decision was that “Control is to 
be maintained over all imports and exports of goods and foreign exchange and nancial transactions.” 
is control was exercised by SCAP, subject to further formulation of policies by FEC. Within the State 
Department, discussions were being made on:
– Whether SCAP could delegate control over the Japanese Government on matters regarding 
foreign exchange and international nancial transactions;
– If the Japanese Government could undertake and adhere to the Articles of the IMF which 
require the elimination of exchange controls on current international transactions as soon as the 
international nancial position of Japan permits; and
– If Japan could freely discuss and consult with the IMF as to the above policies, once Japan became 
a member.
e conclusion to these discussions within the US Government evolved around the FEC policy 
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decisions on Japan. e understanding was also that the FECʼs policy would not be determined 
without the concurrence of both the US and the UK which were supporting Japanʼs application to IMF 
membership suggesting that were no problems in considering Japan being able to fulll her functions 
in and obligations to the IMF.10 On this basis, SCAPʼs letter to IMF was prepared and part of the letter 
stated that: “［…］ e Commander not only has no objection to the assumption of such obligations by 
the Japanese Government, but heartily endorses and is fully sympathetic with the aspirations of the 
Japanese people and Government to participate in IMF. ［…］ It is the duty of the Supreme Commander 
to maintain general surveillance over the activities of the Japanese Government until a treaty of peace 
become eective.” e Application Letter was transmitted to the IMF in August 1951 signed by Prime 
Minister Yoshida.11
A month later aer the receipt of the application from Japan, the IMF Board established the 
Committee on Membership for Japan. e rst job of the Committee was to review the Memorandum 
entitled “Calculation of the Quota for Japan” prepared by the Far Eastern Division dated October 4, 
1951.12 e basic formula used for the calculation was the original Bretton Woods formula, as shown 
below, with the major variables being national income, gold and foreign exchange reserves and exports 
as well as imports:
e Original Bretton Woods formula was denoted in symbols as:
QC＝（0.02Y＋0.05R＋0.010M＋0.10V） （1＋X/Y）
 Where QC＝Calculated quota
 Y＝National income, 1940
 R＝Gold and foreign exchange reserves as of July 1, 1943
 X＝Average annual exports （ve-year average）, 1934–38
 M＝Average annual imports （ve-year average）, 1934–38
 V＝Maximum uctuation in exports dened as the dierence between the highest and 
lowest value of exports in 1934–38.
10 Memorandum, L. D. Stinebower, Department of State to Frank A. Southard, IMF July 10, 1951, Japanese Membership in 
the IMF with three attachments: 1. Copy SCAP Statement. It is interesting to note that e Stinebowerʼs memo supports 
Japanʼs entrance to IMF/IBRD  by mentioning positive political results in Japan and increased foreign exchange availability 
required for development eorts including hydroelectric eld.; 2. Memorandum to Mr. Snow 6/28/51; and 3. Memorandum 
from Mr. Snow 7/2/51, Japan—Application for Membership, Box # 7 File # 2, IMF Archives. Also Memorandum, Andre. van 
Campenhout to Frank A. Southard, Executive Director, IMF July 17, 1951, Japan—Application for Membership, Box # 7 File # 
2, IMF Archives.
11 Executive Board Document No. 953, Japan-Application for Membership and two attachments: 1. Prime Minister Yoshida, 
Letter of Application for the Membership in IMF, August 9, 1951; and, 2. Lieutenant General Doyle O. Hickey, Oce of the 
Chief of Sta of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Transmitting the Application of the Japanese Government for 
Membership in IMF, August 14, 1951, August 21, 1951, Box # 7 File # 1, IMF Archives.
12 Committee on Membership—Japan Document No.1, e Secretary to Members of the Committee on Membership—Japan 
October 9, 1951, Preliminary Calculation of the Quota for Japan according to the Pre-Bretton Woods Quota, Box # 7 File # 1, 
IMF Archives
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ere were fundamental issues on Japanʼs application on the basis of the above formula, especially 
in determining Japanese Quota: “In view of the signicant changes in the Japanese economy between 
the prewar and the postwar period, it is necessary to examine the question whether the years of 
reference used in the components of the Bretton Woods formula can be appropriately applied to 
Japan”. （Ibid., p. 1） In other words, there were good reasons to adjust the value of those variables as 
there were territorial changes and abnormal economic activities associated with the war activities 
carried out by Japan.
On the 1940 national income, the Memorandum argued that the Japanese gure for 1940 was 
inappropriate as the case of Germany. Apparently when German application for IMF membership was 
considered, her national income for 1940 was based not on the gure for 1940 but ones for 1936–1937. 
For it was thought that 1940 was not a representative year neither were 1939 and 1938, because the 
German economy in those years was greatly aected by armament production and the occupation of 
foreign territories. Japanʼs case was also considered in a similar manner. e Memorandum compared 
the then available time series of national income estimates made by Japanese including seven series 
which were quoted in J. B. Cohn: Japanese Economy in War and Reconstruction, Institute of Pacic 
Relations, 1949 and one series from the US State Department. Comparing Japanese and State 
Department gures, the Memorandum concluded that there was substantial agreement in the trend 
and that since State Department gures are the only continuous series, their gures will be used as 
the basis for calculations. It was decided that the gures for national income specic for the year 1940 
would be used for the formula. But aer the trend in national income statistics was compared with the 
trend of employment statistics of Japan in comparison with ones of the US and the UK, it was nally 
decided to use the gures for 1935 from the US State Department series for the national income of 
1940.
In the case of gold and foreign exchange reserves for July 1, 1943, the Memorandum used the 
gure provided by the Ministry of Finance of Japan as of July 1, 1943, and it was equivalent to about 
US$173 million. In the case of exports and imports gures （ve-year average） 1934–38 was used. As 
the Memorandum simply stated that it was dicult to select an alternative, more appropriate period 
and therefore three separate calculations were made: the gures for 1934–38, 1934–38 reduced to 
allow for territorial changes and 1930–34. e rst gure implies no adjustment made to exports and 
imports. e second gure implies adjustment made to trade gures by subtracting from the total 
trade gures with Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria. But since the total subtracting is inappropriate, as 
some of the trade will be replaced with trade with other areas, a calculation was made on the basis of 
50% of reduction of that trade. e third gure implies that the gures 1930–34 seemed to represent 
better the latter years as they were less inuenced by territorial expansion and armament activities.
e Japanese quotas calculated on the basis of adjusted original Bretton Woodsʼs formula as above 
are: （1935 national income and July 1, 1943 gold and dollar holdings are used in all three cases）:
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Calculated Quota
1934–38 Trade Figures US$ 262.9 million
1934–38 Trade Figures With 50% 
Reduction For Territorial Changes
US$ 225.6 million
1930–34 Trade Figures US$ 221.1 million
e Quota without adjustment to the original Bretton Woodsʼs formula was also calculated 
amounting to US$ 300 million, reecting a larger national income and much higher trade gures 
during the war period.
e remaining issue aer the Quota calculations was that Japan was still not an independent 
country, but was still held under occupation. The Legal Department of the IMF prepared a 
Memorandum dated October 12, 1951 and it was circulated to the Members of the Committee on 
Membership—Japan on October 15, 1951 as Document No. 2.13 e Memorandum consisted of two 
parts: one, the legal capacity of Japan to be accepted as a member and two, Japanʼs ability to carry out 
its obligations under the Fund Agreement. e analysis was consistent with one made, as above, at 
the time of the preparation of the supporting letter by SCAP, to the application letter sent by Japan 
in August 1951. e tone of the analysis was stronger than before in support of Japanʼs application 
as the Peace Treaty was signed on September 8, 1951 （signed but not yet ratied until April 28, 
1952）. It discussed the legal points on Japanʼs limited capacity to conduct economic policies and 
international relations as these were under the control of SCAP, FEC and the Allied Council for Japan. 
Its conclusion was that accepting the supervision and active intervention of SCAP “there is no reason 
to assume that the surveillance on the part of SCAP will be exercised in a way which would disqualify 
Japan as a prospective member”. （Ibid., p. 2）  Even before the ratication of the Peace Treaty, the 
IMF was clearly armative about Japanʼs legal capacity to seek membership. Similarly, the IMF 
Memorandum stated that “there is no reason to question Japanʼs ability and preparedness to adjust 
its legal and administrative system in a way that would enable it to abide by its obligations under the 
Fund Agreement, and the standard membership resolution.” （Ibid., p. 5）
In October 1951, the Committee on Membership for Japan met to discuss Document No. 1, 
Preliminary Calculation of the Quota for Japan according to the pre-Bretton Woods Quota, and 
Document No. 2, Japan Admission to Membership. e Committee members were satised that there 
was no longer any legal obstacle for Japan in becoming a member and moved to the address the next 
question on quota. Mr. Southard, US Executive Director, supported by Mr. Paranagua, argued for a 
quota of around US$ 265–270 million, while Mr. Stamp supported by Mr. Melville argued for a lower 
quota, while the UK suggested US$ 200 million or less.14 ough there was no record of the next 
13 Committee on Membership—Japan Document No.2, e Secretary to Members of the Committee on Membership—Japan, 
Japanʼs Admission to Membership, October 15, 1951, Japan—Application for Membership Documentation, Box # 7 File 1, 
IMF Archives.
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meeting in the Archives, the concluding quota became US$ 250 million.15 e Committee prepared a 
Memorandum in order to explain the IMF position to the representatives of the Japanese Government 
（Ambassador Takeuchi et al.） on the following points:
1. Whether the quota of US$ 250 million is acceptable to Japan?
2. Whether Japan was prepared to pay on subscription account US$ 62.5 million in gold on or 
before the date on which the Articles of Agreement are signed and the remainder, equivalent to 
$187 million in yen aer a par value has been agreed?
3. On a suitable period during which the oer of membership should remain open?
4. e basics once agreed upon, would result in the draing of a resolution on its membership that 
would be sent by hand and a positive response from the Government would be awaited.
5. WBʼs representative would explain the conditions of membership to the WB.
On January 23, 1952, Mr. Beyen, Chairman of the Committee on the Membership for Japan, with 
Mr. Horne, Mr. Basyn and Mr. Mendels （for WB） met Ambassador et al. e Japanese representatives 
asked many questions on the quota of US$250 million, specically questions concerning how the 
particular number was arrived at, and explained that the Government had hoped for a higher quota. 
But the Japanese side appeared to be convinced that no good purpose could be served by asking 
the Committee to reconsider. On the 25% deposit in gold, US$ 62.5 million equivalent, Japanese 
representative said that the Diet recently appropriated about US$ 45 million for the purpose and if 
required additional legislation could be passed.16
On the basis of the resolution of April 30, 1952, adopting recommendations of the Committee 
on Membership for Japan, all member countries of the IMF were requested to vote for Japanʼs 
membership during the period 8 through 28 May, 1952. e result of voting was that out of the total 
number of 51 countries, 39 countries （representing 88,385 votes out of total of 94,285 or 93.7%） cast 
in favor; 10 countries （Bolivia, Burma, Costa Rica, Finland, Guatemala, Iraq, Panama, Paraguay, 
Philippine Republic and Venezuela） did not vote; Chile abstained; and, Czechoslovakia cast against.17 
Japan had time until August 15, 1952 to take actions on “Payment of Subscription”, “Notication of the 
par value of its currency”, and others. All these conditions were met and the Agreement with IMF was 
signed on August 13, 1952. e Agreement with WB was signed on the same day as well.
e Annual Report of the WB for 1952–1953 simply reports “Japan, with a subscription of $250 
million, the Federal Republic of Germany, with a subscription of $330 million, and Jordan, with a 
14 Committee on Membership—Japan Minutes of Meeting 1 October 19, 1951, Japan—Application for Membership 
Documentation Box # 7 File 1, IMF Archives.
15 Memorandum, Roman L. Horne, Secretary of Committee on Membership—Japan, to J. W. Beyen, Appointment with Japanese 
Representatives, January 23, 1952, Japan—Application for Membership, Box # 7 File # 2, IMF Archives.
16 Memorandum, Roman L. Horne, Secretary of Committee on Membership—Japan, to Files, Meeting with Japanese 
Representatives, January 23, 1952, Japan—Application for Membership, Box # 7 File # 2, IMF Archives.
17 EBD/52/90,  e Secretary to Members of the Executive Board, Application for Membership—Japan, May 29, 1952, Japan—
Application for Membership Documentation, Box # 7 File # 1, IMF Archives.
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subscription of $3 million, became members of the Bank on August 13, 14 and 29, 1952, respectively. 
Bank membership was thus raised to 54, and its total subscribed capital to $9,036,500,000.”18
3.?Receiving the First Loan
Joining the WB for Japan meant that it would have more choices than before in getting extra 
foreign exchange resources. In fact, Japan rst approached the Export–Import Bank of the US for the 
nancing of its thermal power plants on order from the US by the three private companies （Chubu, 
Kyushu and Kansai Power Companies）. According to a meeting between the WB and the Export–
Import Bank of the US in October 1952, the plants orders were already placed with Westinghouse 
and General Electric with a total amount of nancing adding up to US$25 million.19 For Japan, it was 
soon to discover a dierent WB, especially that of her expectations. For Japan, her understanding on 
the role of the WB was that it nances large public investment projects including local cost nancing, 
and the role of the Export-Imports Bank of the US was that it nances private companiesʼ equipment 
imports manufactured by US companies. But this was all about to change.
As part of its rst business with Japan, the WB sent the economic mission consisting of two 
economists to Japan for a stay of about three months, between October and December 1952. e 
main purpose of the economic mission was to investigate the overall aspects of Japanʼs economic 
and nancial problems. As the mission only composed of two economists, it meant that the WB 
did not send sector specialists and thus it did not take any responsibility to identify specic projects 
for possible lending to Japan. e Terms of Reference for the economic mission was a standard one 
covering such topics as “Production and Investment Requirements”, “Availability of Resources for 
Financing Reconstruction and Development, “Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments”.20 During 
this mission the Vice President of the WB made a short visit to Japan to get an overall impression of 
the country.
Japan welcomed the mission enthusiastically and on its arrival the Government presented a 
document entitled “Projects for Which Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development are desired”.21 e total investment, both foreign and domestic cost, was estimated 
at about US$863 million. It was prepared by an inter-ministerial committee listing out a number of 
urgent projects of which some could opt for WB nancing. Looking at the document, it was clear that 
Japan was expecting local cost nancing, as many projects had large investment requirements but 
with small foreign exchange components. e mission met a large number of key ocials, bankers 
18 Chapter V Miscellaneous, Membership and Subscription, p. 45, WB Eighth Annual Report 1952–1953.
19 Memorandum, W. M. Gilmartin to Files, Consideration of Further Ex-Im Credit to Japan, October 15, 1952. Japan—General, 
Folder # 1857454 Box # 5, WB Archives.
20 Mission to Japan—Terms of Reference, Joseph Rucinski to John C. de Wilde, October 14, 1952. Japan—General, Folder # 
1857454 Box # 5, WB Archives.
21 “Projects for Which Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Are Desired”, Japanese 
Government, October 18, 1952, Japan—General, Folder # 1857454 Box # 5, WB Archives.
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and industrialist groups, Ministers of Finance as well as Foreign Aairs and the Governor of the 
Bank of Japan. As Japan was expecting the mission to nd suitable projects for WB nancing, the two 
economists had a dicult time explaining the main purpose of their visit, which was to get acquainted 
with the overall economic situation of Japan.
e missionʼs main economic conclusions presented in the Report of June 18, 1953 were at best 
cautious as the economy was experiencing a deteriorating balance of payments position and a rapid 
increase in public expenditures in support of industries. It also observed a rapid recovery from the 
physical damages that were inicted during the war, as there was a large resurgence in industrial and 
agricultural production levels. Although the balance of payments position improved somewhat with 
the foreign exchange reserves increasing to $1 billion as of April 1953, the current account decit 
in 1952 amounted to US$750 million, which was more than what was covered by the US special 
procurements. is included payments on US government procurement contracts placed in Japan 
primarily to support the Korean War eort and expenditures of US personnel in Japan, amounting to 
US$800 million in 1952. Aer the Korean War, it was only natural for the WB to be concerned about 
the possible reduction in this category of dollar earnings and the mission felt that Japan had to nd 
alternative ways to earn foreign exchange. At best, the report estimated that by 1957 the decit would 
amount to US$ 400 million.
e Report suggested that in order to reduce her dependence on special dollar exchange earnings 
and reduce her trade decit, a considerable volume of domestic investment would be necessary. e 
goal of greater self-support implied that it required much higher levels of industrial and agricultural 
production with the adoption of new technology, a corresponding expansion in transport and 
communications and in the generation and distribution of electric power. e Report clearly indicated 
its concern over the Japanese governmentʼs ability to nance future investment requirements without 
resorting to ination. e renewed ination would increase the demand for imports and at the 
same time seriously reduce Japanese exports some of which were already experiencing diculty 
in competing in foreign markets. e current disequilibrium in the trade balance would thus be 
aggravated rather than improved.
To avoid ination and ensure the volume of investment essential to greater self-support, it was 
most of all necessary to strike a close balance between investment requirements and capital resources. 
A careful husbanding of resources was considered essential. The Government was expected to 
institute a strict screening of future investment needs based upon appropriate scal and credit policies; 
encourage savings and essential investments while discouraging less urgent investments. In order to 
release more resources for investment the rise in consumption was to be restricted by tax policies and 
through curtailing consumption outlays within the government budget. e Japanese government was 
resolved to screen future investment requirements through determining appropriate priorities. Once 
these policies were implemented based on the set priorities, it was possible to avoid serious ination 
and large-scale foreign exchange borrowing.22
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As far as the investment needs were concerned, the Economic Report stated that “Undoubtedly 
a rapid expansion of electric power supply will have to take place, not only in view of the current 
shortage which have necessitated rationing and curtailment of loads during the low-water period in 
the winter, but especially in view of the considerable increase in industrial production contemplated 
over the next ve years.” In the Chapter 5 of the Report, Investment Requirements and Problems, the 
rst subject discussed was regarding the problems with electric power.23 Aer describing the power 
sector, the Report continued listing the required investments. e main themes were: rationalizing 
industry in order to achieve a reduction in costs and improvement in quality, particularly in the iron, 
steel and coal mining industries; the need to increase domestic food production through improved 
irrigation and drainage to save on foreign exchange outlays on imported food; expansion of transport 
capacity through railway electrication and the expansion of the merchant marine; and investment in 
communications and housing.24
In view of the volatile nature of a considerable part of Japanʼs foreign exchange income, the 
Report stated that it was necessary for Japan to maintain relatively large foreign exchange reserves. 
Some foreign borrowing would provide Japan with an extra foreign exchange cushion with which 
to meet the possible impact of additional investments on its foreign exchange position, in the years 
immediately ahead. Indirectly the Report explained the potential role of the WB at that juncture of 
the Japanese economy. e WB was cautious at best and took a safe approach of ʻwait and seeʼ. In 
particular, it wanted to observe the political stability, the governmentʼs ability to govern and control 
ination. is was to be achieved through a clearer delineation of priority on public investments and 
the future of US policy towards Japan, in the context of the overall US policy in Asia.
While the WB was nalizing the Economic Report, there were two separate but important 
events that determined the lending strategy of the WB towards Japan. One was related to Japanʼs 
request for WB loans worth US$122 million for nancing three major electric power projects over 
1952–1957, two by the Electric Power Development Company, and another by the Kyushu electric 
Power Company—one of the nine private power companies. e proposal was part of the projects list 
document that the economic mission received on its arrival in Japan.25 Since the WB knew of Japanʼs 
request to the Export–Import Bank of the US, seeking to borrow for the power sector and the new 
request for Bank nancing, the WB had to decide how to react to the two and to decide the nal tone 
of the Economic Report. It particularly had to respond to the “Prospects”, of which specic contents 
were strongly inuenced by USʼs policies in Asia. e WB did check with US Government on its 
policy towards Japan. According to information available in the Archives, the WB requested for a 
22 Economic Report, Japan: Economic Situation and Prospects, July 18, 1953, pp. i–vi, the World Bank.
23 Ibid., pp. 72–74.
24 Ibid., pp. 75–81.
25 Memorandum, J. C. de Wilde to Files, Japanese Requests for IBRD Loans, April 10, 1953, Japan—General, Folder # 1857454 
Box # 5, WB Archives.
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formal meeting with US Government to comprehend USʼs thinking on:
1. Prioritizing investment towards improving the balance of payments position or whether to 
enhance the self-help measures that were to be implemented by Japan
2. Desirability of WB lending and the amount
3. e importance of one single institution that should lend to Japan and
4. e future support of the US Government to the Japanese economy.26
e meeting between the WB and US Government took place on May 14, 1953 and it eventually 
set the basis for WB lending policy towards Japan. e meeting was between President Black of 
WB and US Government representatives including Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Aairs, Mr. Linder, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Aairs, Mr. 
Overby, Assistant secretary of the Treasury, and Messrs. Corbett and Young of the State Department. 
According to the Memorandum of June 4, 1953, Mr. Black opened the meeting by expressing his 
strong view on the role of the WB as the sole lender in the case of Japan, which had already been 
explained to the Japanese Ambassador and his sta. e US side did not disagree on this point, as 
a matter of principle that there should only be one institution that should provide the necessary 
development nancing. It felt however, that there might be certain special circumstances or cases, 
justifying an exception to this general principle. For example one case where the discussions between 
Export-Import Bank of the US and Japan on loans for thermal power projects had reached such an 
advanced stage that it was dicult to abandon the proposed transaction. e US emphasized that 
there were urgent political and economic reasons for proceeding swily with the nancing of the 
Japanese power projects. On the contrary, a decision by the US not to proceed at this stage with the 
loans for the thermal power plants would have an adverse eect on USʼs relations with Japan, which in 
some respects were already critical. Under these circumstances, the only way out of this dilemma was 
that the WB takeover the nancing responsibilities of these power projects. Mr. Black agreed and felt 
that this appeared to be the most appropriate solution.
e delegation then provided Mr. Black with an oral explanation of US policies relating to Japan 
in response to the questions, which had been raised in the Bankʼs memorandum. e general tenor of 
these explanations was that:
a. Japan would continue to earn considerable dollar income from the maintenance of US forces in 
Japan, although a concrete gure was not decided upon;
b. e US was expected to ask for repayment of the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas 
（GARIOA） debt, only to the extent that the repayment amount would not impose a signicant 
burden;
c. US wanted to observe how: Japan was going to manage the Bankʼs lending, especially in managing 
26 Memorandum, J. C. de Wilde to Garner, Conversation with U.S. ocials on Japan with the attachment, “IBRD Lending to 
Japan”, March 6, 1953, and Memorandum, J. C. de Wilde to Files, Conversation on Japan between Mr. Black and a Delegation 
on May 14, 1953, June 4, 1953, Japan—General, Folder # 1857454 Box # 5, WB Archives.
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foreign exchange reserves to nance long-term development; the Bankʼs lending would also have 
favorable political psychological eects; and the Bank loan could inuence Japanese policies in the 
right direction;
d. On the possible collaboration between the WB and Japan with a view to letting Japan adopt all 
necessary policies for self-help measures in the economic and nancial elds. e US also stated 
that they are prepared to consult with the Bank on general economic objectives; and,
e. On the development of non-dollar supplies of food and raw materials, the US agreed that every 
eort would have to be made to develop non-dollar supplies of food and raw materials for Japan, 
and that it was prepared to exchange views with the Bank on any project which would promote 
this general objective.
On the basis of the above mentioned discussions and conclusions of the meeting between WB and 
the US Government, Mr. Black had an internal meeting on May 15, 1953 to decide what to do on the 
loans originally proposed by Export–Import Bank of the US. Mr. Black thought that the WB could be 
the nancier of the loans if the proposed loans were sound, self-sporting and technically feasible. e 
Departments concerned were instructed in the meeting to investigate all available data and materials 
on the proposed loans, to evaluate the technical feasibility and to justify going ahead without an 
international competitive bidding on the plants apparently, already ordered.27
Responding to the instructions, the WB sent several sta to New York City to check on the 
existing situation of the proposed loans totaling US$40 million, by the Export–Import Bank of the 
US. ey met representatives of Westinghouse and International General Electric and consultants 
from Gilbert Associates （assigned to work on the two 75,000 KW units for Kansai Power company） 
and Ebasco （assigned to work on the 75,000 KW unit for Kyushu Power company）. e main points 
covered in the meeting were: 1） e competitiveness of American equipment manufacturers in 
comparison with the European manufacturers; 2） e licensing arrangements to manufacture plants 
in Japan in the future; 3） Status of orders for equipment; 4） possible participation in nancing by the 
manufacturers; and, 5） electric power rates in Japan.
On point 1 the WB was told by both International General Electric and Westinghouse that they 
were far ahead of the other countries in manufacturing on time high-pressure, high-temperature, 
thermal equipment that Japan wished to procure. ey also explained that Japanese companies 
shopped around for this equipment. On point 2 the two explained that though there is no integral 
relation between the proposed contracts for equipment and the licensing arrangements, the Japanese 
Government attaches great importance to potential licensing agreements. Such agreements would 
allow for thermal equipments to be manufactured in Japan in the future, as well as generating 
foreign exchange savings. On point 3, the manufacturers indicated that virtually all arrangements 
27 Memorandum, F. D. Gregh to Files, Loans from ExImbank and the World Bank to Japan, May 19, 1953, Japan—General, 
Folder # 1857454 Box # 5, WB Archives.
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for production including those with subcontractors have been completed. Contracts were ready to 
be signed as soon as nancing was assured. On point 4, though the manufacturers committed to the 
Export-Import Bank of the US to participate in up to 25 % with the understanding that they would 
take earlier maturities, but with the WB, they indicated they would have to consult with the respective 
companies. On point 5, the two consultants were of the opinion was that there was some assurance 
that rates would go up as they had indicated in their projections, but the WB sta were more doubtful 
of any easy rate increase in the future, given Japanʼs economic situation.28 On the basis of these 
ndings in New York and with further scrutiny the WB was prepared to justify the WBʼs nancing of 
the negotiated contracts for thermal power equipment, required by Japan.29
Aer ascertaining US policy towards Japan and the status of the negotiated contracts for thermal 
power plants originally to be nanced by the Export–Import Bank of the US, the WB explained to the 
Japanese government its approach on nancing in Japan. On June 2, 1953, the WB management met 
Japanese Ambassador Araki et al. Mr. Garner, Vice President of the WB, explained several key points 
pertinent to WBʼs lending to Japan. First of all, it was the principle of the WB operations that consisted 
of not only selecting and nancing good project to lend to, but it was the purpose of the WB to also 
establish a good working relationship to assist Japan in solving its economic problems and in achieving 
economic development.
Part of the WBʼs job was to assess how much foreign exchange Japan can borrow given its 
limited exports and reserves. Consistent with this particular point and with a view to suppressing the 
over expectation concerning the WBʼs lending to Japan, the lending amount was limited to US$100 
million as a total for the following few years. e WB carefully explained the other factors that led to 
determining the US$100 million gure, which also included the uncertainty of dollar income in the 
future, and the possible repayment obligation of GARIOA debt as well as war reparation payments. 
WB also explained that the US$100 million debt limit only applied to the Government and the public 
sector, and did not include lending to private entities.
On the economic management front, Mr. Garner emphasized that the Government had to 
set priorities for better resource allocation. On the dierences between Japanʼs original request for 
nancing three hydro-dam power projects and the thermal power projects, in accordance with 
WBʼs principle policy, he explained that the WB nances only direct foreign exchange expenditures 
on imported equipment and services required for project implementation. He made it clear that 
Japan should not expect the Bank to nance the dam construction projects as they involve local 
cost nancing, as the construction cost did not involve large foreign exchange expenditures. e 
WB went on to explain that the local cost nancing was done in the past under rather exceptional 
28 Memorandum, J. C. de Wilde to Messrs. Gregh and Rucinski, Conversations with IGE and Westinghouse, May 22, 1953, 
Japan—Power Project, Folder # 1857615, Box # 13, WB Archives.
29 Memorandum, J. C. de Wilde to Messrs. Gregh and Rucinski, Proposed Loan on Japanese ermal Power Projects, May 22, 
1953, Japan—Power Project, Folder # 1857615, Box #13, WB Archives.
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circumstances.30
With the turn of events, it was clear that the WB did not make the usual analysis in choosing the 
power sector as the priority sector for its rst lending operation to Japan, out of all the other important 
sectors. Information regarding the energy sector at large, before going on to analyze the issues with the 
power sector in Japan, was generally missing. is clearly suggested that the WB, for its rst lending 
operation relied on the information provided by Export–Import Bank of the US and the suppliersʼ 
consultants, and interestingly the appraisal report （or the project evaluation report） was prepared 
without visiting Japan. But eventually the WB made the decision to go ahead with nancing imports 
for the thermal power plants in Japan. Certainly some sta at the WB must have shown concern about 
the dierences in Japanʼs original hydropower projects proposal and the thermal power projects that 
were identied to be nanced by Export–Import Bank of the US. ere were also apprehensions that 
there were more important sectors that required urgent nancing, including irrigation projects and 
coal projects for rationalization of the coal sector, to directly support self-help projects. In other words, 
the WB was only ready to help nance part of the Japanese foreign exchange requirements. Japan was 
not oered reconstruction loans, similar to those that were oered to France, Netherland, Denmark 
and Luxembourg; to nance essential imports without specifying imported goods. Also Japan was not 
oered any program loans as well as local cost nancing.
Upon this decision, the WB announced that Japan and WB would convene discussions on the 
general approach of the WB nancing towards Japanʼs economic development. ree power projects 
for the Chubu, Kansai and Kyushu Electric Companies were mentioned as possible basis for the WBʼs 
initial investment in Japan. An unusual process was followed in making preparation for the power 
loans, as it was explained in the Presidentʼs Report31:  “［…］. Late 1952 these companies applied to 
Export–Import Bank of the US for loans totaling about $40 million to pay for the foreign exchange 
cost of installing in three plants, modern high pressure, high temperature thermal generating 
equipment of U. S. manufactures. Discussion of these projects between representatives of this Bank 
and Export–Import Bank of the US led to the conclusion that this nancing might most appropriately 
be considered by this Bank, and the Board was so advised by the Vice President in May 1953. Basic 
analysis and appraisal of the projects was carried out by the Bank sta from data supplied by technical 
consultants of the power companies. Supplemental information was obtained in discussion with 
technical and nancial representatives of the power companies, the Japan Development Bank, and the 
Japanese government. ［…］”. Internal memorandums indicated that the WB had checked the available 
data on the organization of the three power companies, their nancial status, power demand forecasts 
and power rates and estimated costs of thermal power plants, including prices of similar to the plants 
30 Memorandum, “Conversation with Japanese Ambassador on Bank Financing in Japan on June 2, 1953” transmitted to 
Embassy of Japan on June 5, 1953, Japan—General, Folder # 1857454 Box # 5, WB Archives.
31 Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors concerning ree Proposed Loans to the Japan 
Development Bank for ermal Power Projects, October 6, 1953, the World Bank.
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to be imported by Japanese power companies manufactured in the US and Europe.
e Technical Report32 and the President Report explain that the total power consumption in 
Japan would increase from about 41 billion KWh in 1952 to about 53 billion KWh in 1957. is 
estimate accounted for about a 28% increase in demand by industrial consumers during the same 
period. Against this increase, expansion plans of Japanese utility companies called for another net 
increase between 1952 and 1957 of 2.9 million KW in installed capacity, of which about 630,000 KW 
would be thermal and 2,260,000 KW hydro. In terms of eective capability, the increase in thermal 
capacity would be almost only 780,000 KW but it would be 1,865,000 KW for hydro at average water 
levels. e corresponding investment expenditures for the expansion were estimated at US$1.8 billion 
by the nine private utility companies and US$530 million for the other power companies, i.e., local 
governments, Japan Electric Power Resources Development Company and captive plants. e three 
private power companiesʼ share of the total nine private companies installed capacity was 37% of the 
total and 42% of the nine power companies.
According to the Technical Report, the three companies,33 of the total of nine power companies 
in Japan, were the most important power companies for the manufacturing sector, for exports. 
Moreover they were short of generating capacity and all of them had deferred replacements and 
maintenance aer they faced diculties during their wartime operations, mainly due to a lack of 
funds. Each system was operating at its optimum, maximizing the utilization of hydropower but even 
then the output of the hydro plants largely uctuated and were unpredictable, mostly depending on 
the rainfall. e steam plants were then used to supplement the production of the hydro plants during 
the dry season. One striking feature of all the systems were the high-energy loss in transmission, 
transformation and distribution of power. ese losses reected in part the deferred maintenance 
as well as the need for newline capacity to relieve the overload conditions on the transmission and 
distribution network. ese losses were particularly large for the Kansai system. It is interesting to 
note that the Report clearly stated that “［…］ It may well prove to be more practical for the Japanese 
economy to live with shortages of power in some dry years or during part of the year in order to 
preserve the low power rates inherent in the existing hydro-steam capacity ratio rather than to embark 
upon expansion. ［…］”
Total power demand for 1957 for the three power companies was estimated to increase by 30% 
in comparison with the 1952 levels, based on the growth of the industrial sector for the same period. 
Against this forecast, the expansion programs were prepared and they only included generating 
projects, which had already been undertaken and authorized by the Japanese Government. ese 
programs were later referred to as the “committed programs”: Kansaiʼs total investment for 1952–
1957 would amount to Yen 83.7 billion （equivalent to US$ 232 million）; Kyushuʼs, Yen 61.3 billion 
32 Technical Report on the Chubu, Kansai, and Kyushu ermal Power Projects in Japan, October 7, 1953, the World Bank.
33 ey supply electricity with 60 cycles; and Tokyo and other northern electric power companies, with 50 cycles.
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（equivalent to US$ 170 million）; and, Chubuʼs, Yen 75.5 billion （equivalent to US$ 210 million）. e 
important part of the investment was the proposed new thermal plants operating at high temperatures 
and pressures with low fuel consumption and a thermal eciency well above any operating plant in 
Japan. Specically, the total amount of three loans totaled US$40.2 million of which: for Kansai Power 
US$21.5 million to import of a complete 150,000 KW steam power plant with two generating units of 
75,000 KW each; for Kyushu Power, US$11.2 million to purchase a complete 75,000 KW steam power 
plant with a generating unit identical of the Kansai project; and for Chubu Power US$ 7.5 million 
to obtain a complete 66,000 KW steam power plant with one generating unit aer the installation 
thereof. e resulting savings on the rst year of operation were estimated at a return on investment of 
17% for Kansai, 20% for Kyushu and 6% for Chubu.
To cover costs, attain nancial stability and raise adequate equity capital in appropriate ratio 
to debt nancing, to nance investments, the power rates were to be increased substantially over 
the next few years. In view of the uncertainties regarding the main variables related to the power 
companiesʼ nancial forecasts, the WB minimized the investment and took an optimistic position 
on the improved operational eciency through the implementation of “improvement programs”, for 
the better utilization of existing facilities. e Report proposed the debt-equity ratio to be limited 
to a maximum of 2 to 1, with a view of providing a brake on overexpansion and guarding against an 
unbalanced capital structure.
e overall framework and the negotiating position of the WB were set on the basis of the 
Technical Report mentioned above. The actual discussion between Japanese government, three 
power companiesʼ representatives and the WB started in June 29, 1953. If this date is considered as 
the start date for discussions on the rst loan to Japan, and considering the loan approval day by the 
Board of WB as the end date, October 15, 1953; the negotiations took 3 and a half months. Such a 
long period only for negotiations simply implied that the discussions were dicult and protracted. 
Yet, such duration could also be adequately justied that this was the rst of such agreements on the 
undertaking of projects between Japan and the WB. Moreover, this would naturally take a long time to 
reach, as Japanʼs knowledge of the WB and the WBʼs experience with Japan were still limited. But it is 
worthwhile to look into the reasons why it took such a long time.34 A review of the set of “Minutes of 
the Meetings” between the Japanese delegation and WB indicates that key issues that were discussed: 
Whether the Japan Development Bank （JDB） should be the borrower as proposed by the Japanese 
Government?; Whether Project Agreements between WB and the power companies were required; 
e improvement in nancial condition of power companies and whether the increase in power rates 
should be part of the lending conditions?; and, Whether security arrangements were essential among 
the WB, the Government of Japan, JDB and the power companies?35
34 A complete set of minutes of the meeting between Japanese delegation and WB is available in Japan—Power Project Folder # 
1857615 Box # 13, WB Archives.
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e WB was not comfortable with the idea of lending through the JDB, as it did not prefer an 
intermediary organization between itself and the Power Companies. Moreover the WB was not 
acquainted with the JDBʼs nancial status and its institutional capability as a bank. e WB raised 
various questions regarding the degree of over lending, the volume of existing loans in arrears, and 
the extent of competition with other long-term credit banks in the country. e WB originally, was of 
the understanding that the borrower would be the three individual power companies or the Japanese 
government itself, and not the JDB. It was considered that a loan directly to the Government would be 
the least complicated, but since the Japanese government objected to undertaking a guarantee of direct 
loans to the specic power companies out of nine private power companies, the WB expected that the 
Government would similarly object to making direct loans to the power companies in local currency 
funds for the completion of these projects and other necessary investments. e WB even suggested to 
the Japanese delegation the possibility of making JDB as co-borrower with the Power Companies. In 
the end, Japanese governmentʼs intentions prevailed, and it was decided that the JDB was to become 
the borrower.
Based on this decision to allow the JDB to be the primary borrower, the WB did not have any 
other choice but to introduce the Project Agreements which would dene directly the relationship 
between WB and each of the three power companies, in order to ensure the proper project execution 
by the power companies. e Japanese team initially had diculties in understanding the need for 
Project Agreements, as the execution of the projects was to be ensured through JDB as the borrower. 
Aer all, the proposed loan to Kansai Power Company amounted to about 9% of its investment 
program for 1952–1957; to Kyushu, about 7%; and to Chubu, about 4%. But aer being convinced by 
WBʼs explanation on the need to having the Project Agreements, the point of discussions shied to the 
content of the Project Agreements.
The delegation questioned the real definition of “the Committed Programs” and “the 
Improvement Programs” in relation to the proposed projects and loans, as they made the actual 
implementation of daily business of each company look inexible. e WB tried to explain that: 
the proposed projects were to install new equipment and loans, to nance the procurement of the 
equipment and that all projects were part of larger programs for power development in Japan. Since 
the nancial and economic justication had been made on the basis of an overall plan for electric 
power development, the execution of the Programs were important. Apart from that, any major 
change in the Programs to which the projects were integrally related to, could conceivably, seriously 
aect the nancial condition of the organizations executing the projects, and reduce the prospects 
of the prompt completion of the projects. In order to complete the projects, the power companies 
required substantial amounts of local funds, beyond the amount available to them and JDBʼs 
35 SLC/M/444, Sta Loan Committee, Minutes of Meeting, Friday, July 23, Japan—Power Project Folder # 1857615 Box # 13, 
WB Archives.
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funding remained essential. us, the various nancial agreements were incorporated into the Loan 
Agreements to enable the JDB to provide necessary funds to complete the projects and programs.
e low power rates oered by the Power Companies were also an issue of discussion with the 
WB. As the WB was concerned over the low levels of power rates and the basis on which the power 
levels were being calculated. e WB thought that if the current levels were maintained, the power 
companies might not be able to service necessary debt and to carry out the necessary expansion 
programs. e WB tried to convince the Japanese delegation that the existing rates were extremely 
low in comparison with prices of other commodities and that they would have to be linked with 
the inationary course of prices in Japan. e Agreements then incorporated this factor so that 
an adequate electric power rate structure would be established and maintained, in such a way that 
the integrity of the power development programs would be kept intact. Similarly, to protect the 
basic nancial structure of the power companies, the Agreements included a requirement that each 
company limit its consolidated indebtedness to no more than twice its consolidated capital and 
surplus.
e most dicult issue was related to the security arrangements among the Government of 
Japan, the JDB, the power companies and the WB. e arrangement agreed that no lien or obligation 
could be established on the assets of each power company, which would rank prior to the general 
mortgage that exists or will be created in the future. Between the Government of Japan and the WB, 
the Government was asked to make the provisions of its negative pledge clause, eective upon political 
subdivisions and their agencies including the Bank of Japan. Between the three power companies and 
WB, a similar to the one between JDB and WB was covenanted. According to the WBʼs explanation, a 
negative pledge clause does not give the WB a preferred position. It does protect WB against being put 
in a subordinate position by giving it the right to participate ratably in any lien, which may be created 
by a member of its assets. Its inclusion in the Agreements is, therefore, standard practice from the 
WBʼs point of view.
e reason why the Bank of Japan was mentioned specically was that the general legal structure 
of many central banks, allows for the assets to be automatically covered by such a negative pledge. 
Since in Japanʼs case, its assets of the Bank of Japan are not clearly covered, the loan document 
mentions the Bank of Japan. In order to ascertain the nature of mortgages under Japanese Law, the 
WB requested the help of an American lawyer, （from the legal rm of Messrs. McIvor, Kauman and 
Yamamoto） who had been working in Japan for many years. His presence was particularly helpful in 
avoiding potentially uncomfortable confrontation between the Japanese representatives and the WB 
on belated disclosure of information by the Japanese that the three power companies had outstanding 
obligations to create liens in favor of Japansʼ commercial banks and negative pledge clauses in favor of 
such banks. Apparently the total amount was small and all were cancelled on time to make the loans 
become eective.
In the end, three formal agreements were prepared: A Loan Agreement between WB and JDB; A 
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Guarantee Agreement between Japan and the WB; and A Project Agreement between WB and each 
power company. e recorded information by negotiating ocers were available in abundance at 
the Archives and the only lacking elements were the technical and nancial discussions between the 
representatives of the three power companies and technical/nancial sta of the WB. Still, the general 
picture emerged quite clearly. e WB became the major nancier for Japan instead of the Export- 
Import Bank of the US, and Japan completed negotiations to receive the rst loan from the WB on 
behalf of the three power companies. e three loans were approved by the Board of the WB on 
October 15, 1953. From then on, Japan began its relationship with the WB as a borrower.
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ANNEX 1
Economic/Sector Reports
Date Reportʼs Title Reportʼs Number
06/30/1953 Economic Situation and Prospects （118 pages） A.S. 10-a
May, 1954 Report of 1953 Mission （35） A.S. 18-a
01/03/1955 Present Position and Prospects of Agriculture （48） T.O. 71-a
10/14/1955 Recent Economic and Financial Developments （42） A.S. 44-a
07/25/1957 Development and Prospects of the Economy （57） FE-2a
01/15/1958 Recent Economic and Financial Developments （20） FE-4a
06/24/1958 Japanese Steel Markets Prospects 1957-62 （10） TO-178
12/22/1958 Economic Situation and Prospects （49） FE- 9a
10/14/1959 Economic Position and Prospects （61） FE-13a
04/13/1961 Recent Economic Situation （40） FE-21a
09/13/1963 Current Economic Position and Prospects （71） FE-31a
09/23/1964 Current Economic Position and Prospects （105） FE-39a
11/23/1965 Economic Situation and Prospects （83） FE-47c
Sources: World Bankʼs External Home Page.
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ANNEX 2
Japan?s Borrowing from the World Bank: List of Loans
Board 
Approved 
Date 
mm/dd/yyyy
Borrower and 
Beneciaries Sector
Main Project 
Components
Amount of 
Loan 
US $ million
10/15/1953 Japan Development Bank
　Kansai Power Power Equipment for thermal generators  21.5
　Kyushu Power Power Equipment for thermal generator  11.2
　Chubu Power Power Equipment for thermal generator   7.5
10/25/1955 Japan Development Bank
　Yahata Steel Steel Modernization of a plate mill and 
others
  5.3
02/21/1956 Japan Development Bank Modernization of various plants   8.1
　Nihon Kokan Steel
　Toyota Motor Car and truck man.
　Ishikawajima Heavy Industries Ship building
　Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Ship building
12/14/1956 Japan Development Bank
　Kawasaki Steel Steel Plant and equipment for strip mill  20
12/14/1956 Agricultural Land Development   4.3
　Machinery Public Corporation Agriculture Land reclamation and cattle 
imports
08/08/1957 Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation Agriculture Construction equipment and 
consultants
  7
01/28/1958 Japan Development Bank
　Kawasaki Steel Steel Plant and equipment for blast 
furnace
  8
06/12/1958 Japan Development Bank Power Construction of Kurobe hydro-dam  37
　Kansai Power
06/26/1958 Japan Development Bank
　Hokuriku Power Power Construction of Yuho hydro-dam  25
07/09/1958 Japan Development Bank Steel Plant and equipment for blast 
furnace &
 33
　Sumitomo Metal blooming mill
08/14/1958 Japan Development Bank
　Kobe Steel Steel Plant and equipment for blast 
furnace
 10
09/09/1958 Japan Development Bank
　Chubu Power Power Construction of Hatanagi hydro-
dams &
 29
09/09/1958 Japan Development Bank
　Nippon Kokan Steel Steel Construction of hot/cold mill  22
02/16/1959 Electric Power Dev. Corp. Power Construction of Miboro hydro-dam  10
11/10/1959 Japan Development Bank Steel
　Fuji Steel Expansion of steel making facilities  24
　Yahata Steel Modernization of steel making 
facilities
 20
03/15/1960 Japan Development Bank
　Kyushu Power Power ermal power generator  12
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Board 
Approved 
Date 
mm/dd/yyyy
Borrower and 
Beneciaries Sector
Main Project 
Components
Amount of 
Loan 
US $ million
03/15/1960 Nihon Doro Kodan Expressway Construction of 72 km expressway 
from Amagasaki to Ritto
 40
12/16/1960 Japan Development Bank
　Kawasaki Steel Steel Plate mill construction   6
　Sumitomo Metal Steel Hot strip, plate mill, pipe mill, etc.   7
05/01/1961 Japan National Railways Rail New Tokaido Railway Line  80
11/28/1961 Nihon Doro Kodan Expressway Construction of 111 km expressway 
from Kobe to Nagoya
 40
09/24/1963 Nihon Doro Kodan Expressway Construction of expressway from 
Tokyo and Shizuoka
 75
04/21/1964 Nihon Doro Kodan Expressway Construction of expressway from 
Toyokawa and Komaki
 50
12/22/1964 Metropolitan Highway Corporation Expressway Construction of expressway from 
Haneda to Yokohama
 25
01/12/1965 Electric Power Dev. Corp. Power Kuzuryuu Hydro-dam  25
05/25/1965 Nihon Doro Kodan Expressway Construction of expressway from 
Shizuoka to Toyokawa
 75
09/09/1965 Hanshin Expressway Corporation Expressway Construction of 12.5 km 
expressway in Kobe
 25
07/28/1966 Nihon Doro Kodan Expressway Construction of expressway from 
Shizuoka to Toyokawa
100
Sources: World Bankʼs External Home Page.
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ANNEX 3
Basic Structure of the First WB Projects and Loans
1. Borrower:  Japan Development Bank for each Loan
2. Guarantor:  Japanese Government for each Loan
3. Total Amounts
 of ree Loans US$40.2 million
 of Which  Kansai Power US$21.5 million
    Kyushu Power US$11.2 million
    Chubu Power US$ 7.5 million
4. Date of Loans Singed: 10/15/1953 for each Loan
5. Eective Dates: 12/29/1953 for each Loan
6. Closing Dates: 12/31/1956 for each Loan
7. Terms of Loans: 20 years with 3 years grade period
8. Interest Rate: 5% for each Loan
9. Project Description: e power projects amounting to about US$ 61 million equivalent are to 
assist the three power companies to install a steam power plant generating 60 cycle electricity in 
each company, and the Loans would nance the foreign exchange costs of the Project including 
interest during the construction period. e three projects are:
 Kansai—A complete 150,000 kw steam power plant at Tanagawa on Osaka Bay with two 
generating units of 75,000 kw each designed to operate at high temperatures and pressures with 
the total cost amounting to about US$31 million equivalent;
 Kyushu—A complete 75,000 kw steam power plant at Karita on the northeast shore of Kyushu 
with a generating unit identical in design with those of the Kansai project, with the total cost 
amounting to US$ 17 million equivalent; and,
 Chubu—A complete 66,000 kw steam power plant at Mie in the Yokkaichi port area with one 
generating unit with the total cost amounting to about US$14 million.
10. Security: each of the loans from the Japan Development Bank to the power companies would 
be secured by a “general mortgage” under the laws of Japan on the assets of the three power 
companies, and each such mortgage would be pledge to the WB as collateral security. A “general 
mortgage”, which is the type of security normally taken by the JDB, is in fact a preferential right to 
repayment and not a mortgage right on property in the ordinary sense. e Government of Japan 
has assured the WB that no lien superior to a “general mortgage”, or obligation to establish such a 
lien, exists or will be created by the JDB or the power companies, and covenants to the same eect 
by these organizations would be included in the Loan and Project Agreements.
11. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority
（a） A Loan Agreement between the WB and the Japan Development Bank—Main provisions 
are that the JDB will: cause the power company to perform its obligations under its Project 
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Agreement; nance the local currency necessary to execute the projects; make nancial 
means available for the execution of the improvement and committed programs of the 
power company; covenants that no lien on the assets of the power company which would 
rank prior to the General Mortgage now exists or will be created in the future; and, deliver 
punctually the security documents.
（b） A Guarantee Agreement between Japan and the WB—Main provisions are that the 
Japanese government will; in addition to its guarantee of the JDBʼs nancial obligations to 
the WB, provide to the JDB funds necessary to meet the JDBʼs nancial obligations to the 
three power companies under the Loan Agreements; undertake to make the provisions 
of its negative pledge clause effective upon political subdivisions and their agencies 
including the Bank of Japan; and, maintain electricity rates at sucient  level for the power 
companies to nance facilities adequate to meet power requirements in the area.
（c） Projects Agreements between the WB and Each Power Company—Main provisions 
are that each power company will: complete the committed programs and formulate 
improvement programs for the better utilization of existing facilities including such items 
as reduction of system losses, improved feeder water treatment, additions to existing 
units and improved dispatching practices; consult with the WB for any major changes in 
the capital items covered in the Project Agreements; maintain a ratio of equity to debt of 
not less than 1 to 2, taking into account the present revaluation reserves as equity; and 
covenant that no lien on its assets which would rank prior to the General Mortgage now 
exists or will be created in the future.
12. Justication of the Project: Electric power production in Japan has increased markedly in the 
postwar period, but supply is still short of demand and shortage of power is retarding the growth 
of industrial production. A recent power survey indicates that the power demand would increase 
by 31% from 1952 to 1957. Substantial new investment is essential to meet this expanded demand. 
e thermal power plants being built by the three power companies with the Bank loans are part 
of this expansion program.
 e new thermal power plants would be more ecient than the existing plants and in addition, 
the three companies are taking measures to improve the eciency of their existing systems 
through reducing power losses in transmission, transformation and distribution.
Source: Report and Recommendation of the President to the Executive Directors concerning ree 
Proposed Loans to the Japan Development Bank for ermal Power Projects, October 6, 1953, the 
World Bank.
